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Abstract
This paper presents metrics to estimate the size of political dynasties in the 15th Congress of the Republic 
of the Philippines and analyze the relationship between political dynasty and socio-economic outcomes. 
Results show that political dynasties comprise 70 percent of jurisdiction-based legislators in the current 
Congress. They possess higher net worth and win elections by larger margins of victory compared to not 
political dynasties. Jurisdictions of political dynasties are characterized by lower standards of living, 
lower human development, and higher levels of deprivation and inequality.
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Democracies are widely touted to be able to facilitate and sustain broader and more inclusive 
processes of economic and human development. Scholars associate political democracy with 
more predictable long-run economic growth, enhanced macroeconomic stability, more rational 
management of economic and political shocks and crises, and improved distributional outcomes.
In theory, democracies guarantee equal voice in government decision-making through a range of 
mechanisms like one-person-one-vote, equality in political participation, and free speech. A 
democracy has the potential to cultivate an environment that is responsive to the needs of its 
citizens that, often, brings about higher levels of human capital investments and more inclusive 
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2and equitable social and economic outcomes. However, underdeveloped democratic institutions 
could be associated with weak political participation and thus produce, in some cases, political 
dynasties. Still, political dynasties can exist in any democracy regardless of its structure. A brief 
survey of the literature suggests that the share of legislators with dynastic links to past 
parliaments range from as low as 6 percent in the United States (Dal Bo et al. 2009) or 10 
percent in Argentina (Rossi 2009) to as high as 37 to 40 percent in Japan and Mexico (Asako et 
al. 2010). In the case of the Philippines, the share of political dynasties is estimated between 50 
percent (Querubin 2010a) and 70 percent (calculations of the authors) if the links to the local 
government units are included in the count. 
There is a view that the prevalence of political dynasties signals the deterioration of political 
equality and the resulting political monopoly leads to a deterioration of socioeconomic outcomes 
that prevent people from effectively communicating their needs to their government. Moreover, 
dynastic officials can use the powers of the state for self-serving interests without fear of 
replacement or administrative sanctions. They also skew the selection of political leaders, thereby 
favoring those with influence, possibly preventing the best and the brightest from serving in the 
government, and/or biasing policies in favor of certain groups. Yet, an alternative view suggests 
that political dynasties afford reformists an extended time horizons that enable more effective 
planning and implementation of policies with long-term goals. Politicians with shorter tenures 
often yield to populist demands and shun difficult but necessary reforms that pay-off in the 
future, and are critical to sustained, robust, and inclusive growth. It is also possible that dynastic 
politicians possess legacy-related motivations that are strongly linked with the overall outcomes 
in their respective jurisdictions. Thus, the longer their tenure the more they tend to care about 
long term outcomes. Alternatively, rent-seeking dynastic politicians, upon recognizing the 
pecuniary benefits of adopting growth-oriented policies and strategies, might also be motivated 
towards enacting reforms that would result in considerable and sustainable economic growth in 
their own jurisdictions. In this regard, the net impact of political dynasties on social and 
economic outcomes remains an empirical question. 
This paper presents metrics to estimate the size of political dynasties in the 15th Congress of the 
Republic of the Philippines and analyze the relationship between political dynasty and socio-
3economic outcomes. It is one of the first comprehensive works to map the landscape of political 
dynasties in the country. Laying out the dynastic landscape in the Philippines, the paper examines 
several questions. What is the share of political dynasties in the current 15th Congress of the 
Republic of the Philippines? What is the share of political dynasties in the major political parties 
in the Philippine Congress? What is the pattern of gender distribution among political dynasties? 
What is the age distribution of political dynasties in the current Congress? What is the net worth 
of political dynasties? Are political dynasties associated with higher levels of poverty and 
inequality and lower levels of human development outcomes? Is the standard of living lower in 
provinces dominated by political dynasties? While the analysis herein is not meant to be causal 
in nature, the objective of this paper is to layout an empirical description of dynastic patterns and 
their socio-economic correlates.
In what follows, section 1 provides a review of literature on political dynasties, covering issues 
such as measurement, tenure, and their linkages to poverty, inequality and other socio-economic 
outcomes. Section 2 describes the methodology in this paper then section 3 analyzes the results. 
A final section reiterates the main findings of this paper. 
1. The Setting of Political Dynasties
Why Study Political Dynasties? 
Because of the important nexus between democratic institutions and the market economy, 
political inequality, in turn could be a crucial factor behind other forms of inequality, including 
income inequality. Political inequality could be self-reinforcing, as it could worsen economic and 
other forms of inequality. What results is a type of “low level democratic equilibrium” where 
mutually reinforcing forces of weakened democratic institutions lead to poor economic outcomes 
and vice versa. Thus, studying political dynasties adds further empirical and theoretical insight to 
an analysis of the broader concept of political inequality.
Modern democracies are often characterized by dynastic leadership to some degree. The more 
interesting issue especially for policy is the relationship between political dynasties and socio-
4economic outcomes. Studies that focused on the link between democracy and economic growth 
have still not settled the direction of causation (e.g., Burkhart 1997; Doucouliagos and 
Ulubasoglu 2008; Rodrik 2007; Lee 2005; Morrisson and Murtin 2009; Murtin and Wacziarg 
2011; Plümper and Martin 2003) need to be differentiated from those that examine political 
dynasties within democratic regimes more specifically. With the possible exception Dal Bo et al 
(2009), Rossi (2009), and Asako et al. (2010), and a few path breaking studies in the Philippines 
(e.g. Balisacan and Fuwa 2004; Querrubin 2010a, 2010b) there is little empirical evidence on 
how political dynasties affect socio-economic outcomes, and vice versa.
Why Study the Political Dynasties in the Philippines?
Political dynasties in the Philippines have been the topic of a growing number of studies. 
Teehankee (2007), for instance, argues that the emergence and persistence of political dynasties 
stems from the highly unequal socio-economic structure of Philippine society and the failure of 
the country to develop a truly democratic electoral and party system. The inability of the 
majority to contest the elite is argued to engender numerous political dynasties. Coronel (2007) 
further suggests that a combination of factors like wealth, popularity, political machinery, 
alliances, myth, and violence contribute to the formation of political dynasties. Wealth is crucial 
because running for and remaining in office is costly. Indeed, Sidel (1997) notes that Philippine 
politicians spend an inordinate amount of money in order to have an effective political campaign 
because of the need to compete with and/or engage in vote buying, electoral fraud, and coercion. 
On the other hand, political success opens opportunities and resources to enable political 
dynasties to consolidate and expand their economic and power bases (McCoy 1994). 
But wealth and popularity are not sufficient to form political dynasties because political success 
requires political machinery. Coronel (2007) thus argues that the success of a political campaign 
is contingent on the creation of a political network capable of transforming wealth and influence 
into votes. Coronel notes that political dynasties often consolidate their power through mergers, 
but Sidel adds that several dynasties succeed because of their affiliation with more powerful 
political entities. Thus, forging alliances with the larger and more powerful political families 
enables prospective political dynasties to draw upon larger pools of resources and broaden their 
5political influence. Some political dynasties are also known to complement their advantages or 
compensate for their disadvantages with the systemic use of violence and intimidation.1 The long 
history of politically motivated assassinations indicates that violence provides some dynastic 
politicians the opportunity to remove or grievously cripple the rival political dynasties.2
Recent analyses on the Philippine Congress arrive at results that cohere with the earlier studies. 
Querrubin (2010a), for example, estimates that the capacity for self-perpetuation of Filipino 
legislators is three times higher than that of legislators in the United States. Meanwhile, Balisacan 
and Fuwa (2004) uncover evidence that the presence of political dynasties influence the growth 
in expenditure but not the reduction in poverty. In addition, they find that political dynasties are 
negatively associated with subsequent income growth.  
Possible Framework for Political Dynasties Research
In forging an agenda for an empirical analysis of political dynasties, it would be useful to outline 
its possible linkages with socio-economic outcomes. In theory, democracies promote political
equality through, say, one-person and one-vote arrangement, equality before the law, and free 
speech, among others. In turn, such provisions are expected to enhance the equal consideration 
of the preferences and response to the needs of citizens. In countries where the vast majority is 
from the lower income segment of society, democratic institutions potentially open the door for 
more responsive and pro-poor policy-making. This setting is critical in terms of investments in 
human capital, which are important for long-term economic growth. Democracies could therefore 
contribute to the reduction of poverty and income inequality as well as to the promotion of 
inclusive economic growth.
Nevertheless, there are factors that can weaken political participation and representation. Put 
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in the Philippines turned to violence and intimidation as part of their political strategies.
2 Indeed, there are similar experiences in Europe where aristocracies thrived even with broader 
democratization and political change in that region (Lacey 1983).
6differently, there are many de jure democracies but less de facto democracies. The contention of 
this paper is that an important element of such scenarios is political dynasties. 
Various factors contribute to the rise of political dynasties, including the prohibitive cost of 
running for office, rising influence of political lobbies, and factors influencing voting behavior 
such as name recall.3 As noted earlier, membership to a political dynasty increases one’s chances 
of being elected into office and allows the politician to constrain competition by excluding most 
citizens from participating in political leadership roles. Once in the position of power, dynastic 
officials could (but not necessarily) promote narrow class interests. Political participation can be 
further weakened (and political dynasties strengthened) through imperfect information and voter 
disillusionment. In turn, the people may misinterpret political platforms, vote candidates who do 
not represent their interests, or altogether dismiss the need to scrutinize political platforms and 
go for personality or vote along patronage lines.
The lack of political competition and the prevalence of political dynasties affect socio-economic 
outcomes through at least three channels. First, if the prevalence of political dynasties prevents 
the majority of the citizenry from effectively communicating their needs to the government, it 
could prevent the government from effectively responding to social and economic problems. The 
misrepresentation (or inadequate representation) of the excluded groups could skew poverty 
reduction policies and income redistribution mechanisms, worsen poverty and income inequality, 
and ultimately compromise the capacity of the government to provide the most necessary public 
goods. Second, democratic institutions could be compromised if dynastic officials use the powers 
of the state for self-serving interests. Finally, political dynasties could skew the selection of 
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captured by those who run them. Second, in maturing democracies, more organized and well-
endowed groups could have growing opportunities to gain power and influence. See 
Proud’homme (1995), Hutchcroft and Rocamora (2003), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), 
Manacsa and Tan (2005) and Rivera (2011).
7political leaders favoring those with influence and prevent the best and the brightest from serving 
in government to bring about sub-optimal policy and, in the end weak, socio-economic outcomes.  
On the other hand, dynastic rule can be argued to provide longer time horizons on which to plan 
and implement reforms with long-term development objectives. One possible outcome is that a 
politician with short tenure and who is seeking re-election may opt for projects and policies with 
immediate results, providing less emphasis on promising projects and policies whose returns 
become visible only under a longer horizon and may therefore become realized under subsequent 
regimes. The recognition of longer time horizons can induce improved performance even from 
rent-seeking politicians. Upon recognizing that their personal pecuniary interests are inimitably 
tied to the social and economic outcomes of their jurisdictions, these politicians could be inclined 
to invest in the productive capacities of their jurisdictions. As with the so-called “stationary 
bandits” argument, rent-seeking politicians would work towards ensuring the continued survival 
and expanding the productive capacities of their constituents (Olson 2003). Accordingly, it is 
possible that patronage politics contribute to the survivability of political dynasties.4
Moreover, political dynasties could have a causal effect on socio-economic outcomes through 
policy choices made by incumbents. At the same time, socio-economic conditions could be part 
of what explains the emergence of political dynasties. Political equality in a democratic setting 
can help facilitate inclusive economic growth by promoting broader access to public services that 
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possible that they influence dynastic patterns across the country. Indeed, Solon et al. (2009) finds 
evidence that Philippine Governors enjoy higher success of getting re-elected with larger public 
spending on education and health, among other development spending items. That study, 
however, does not account for the possible leakages in development spending which journalistic 
reports have estimated to be in the range of 12-25 percent for infrastructure projects to well over 
50 percent for schoolbooks, medicines and other human capital investment inputs (Parreño, 
1998). Some spending may be beneficial to each local jurisdiction and could translate to votes. 
However, continued corruption and rent seeking may prove inimical to sustained human capital 
investment, economic competitiveness and growth in the longer term.
8enhance human capital and providing better employment and business opportunities to a greater 
proportion of the population through a more responsive government. In this way, democracy 
indirectly enhances social outcomes through improvements in the provision of public health and 
education and the elimination of unnecessary transaction costs and social costs brought about by
corruption. The emergence of a truly representative and democratic government could bring 
about these outcomes. Furthermore, a truly representative and democratic government could be 
more attuned to the needs of its constituents and as such has an enhanced capacity to respond to 
economic and political shocks and crises. 
2. Data and Methodology
The empirical mapping of political dynasties begins with the House of Representatives of the 
15th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines and extends back to the 12th Congress. Socio-
economic and demographic profile of the legislators are obtained along with the district-level 
indicators for standard of living, poverty and inequality. Data on the party-list are not covered by 
the database. 
Measuring political dynasties
The measurement of political dynasty is done through a family-name identification approach that 
is applied on two levels: the House of Representatives and the Local Government Units. Several 
limitations to this procedure need to be pointed out. First, kinship relations can extend beyond 
consanguinity to include affinity and other relations associated with the extended family setup. 
Such dimension of kinship relations is particularly relevant when there are intermarriages 
between political dynasties. Second, two individuals can share the same family name yet they 
may not be related at all. Third, the starting point in the identification process is the membership 
of the 15th Philippine Congress: political dynasties that do not have a family member in the 
current Congress (for whatever reason) end up excluded in the count. Similarly, given that the 
coverage of the count is between the 12th and 15th Congresses, other political dynasties also end 
up being excluded in the count. Nonetheless, we argue that our estimates are minimum measures 
of political dynasty in the Philippines. Querrubin (2010a, 2010b), however, notes that datasets 
9that include middle names in the compilation turn out to give similar results to datasets that 
restrict to family names only.5
Hence, a current representative in the 15th Congress is identified to belong to a political dynasty 
if that legislator shares the same last name with at least one other legislator in the 12th, 13th, or 
14th Congresses. The result is called “Dynasty1,” which, in turn, is extended in three ways. 
“Dynasty2” is defined as a legislator who shares the same last name with past officials at the 
local government units elected in 2001, 2004, or 2007. To manage the mapping, identification is 
limited to the governors, vice governors, mayors, and vice mayors—this adjustment has not yet 
been done in the literature on political dynasties but it is especially relevant to the Philippines. 
“Dynasty3” is defined as a legislator who shares the same family name with other legislators 
who served in at least one Congress between the 12th to 15th Congresses as well as with at least 
one official at the local government units elected between 2001 and 2010. Lastly, “Dynasty0” is 
defined as a legislator who shares the same family name with another legislator who was a 
member in the previous Congresses and another current member of the present Congresses as 
well as past and present official at the local government units elected between 2001 and 2010. In 
summary, the four indices are:
 Dynasty1: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links to at least 
one legislator in the 12th, 13th,, or 14th Congress;
 Dynasty2: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links to at least 
one legislator in the 12th, 13th, or 14th Congress, or at least one local government 
official elected in 2001, 2004 and 2007;
 Dynasty3: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links to at least 
one legislator in the 12th, 13th, 14th, or 15th Congress, or at least one local 
government official elected in 2001, 2004, 2007 or 2010;
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persons who are more familiar with the local context and ground-level politics. 
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 Dynasty0: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links to at least 
one legislator in the 12th, 13th, and 14th congress and at least one other legislator in 
the 15th Congress as well as at least one local government official elected in 2001, 
2004, 2007, and 2010. 
3. Analysis of Political Dynasties
Descriptive Results
Statistics on the 15th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines at the district and province 
level are shown in Tables 1 and 2. Estimates on the political dynasty indicators are show in Table 
3. Close to 40 percent of the Congressmen (84 of 229) have kinship links with legislators in the 
previous three Congresses. There is extensive anecdotal and journalistic evidence suggesting that 
Dynasty1 needs to be expanded to cover the linkages not just to the past members of Congress 
but also elected officials of the local government units. Thus, Dynasty2 indicates that political 
dynasty increases to 63 percent of the Congress. About 70 percent (Dynasty3) of the district 
legislators of the 15th Congress possess kinship links to past legislators, past local government 
executives, as well as present legislators and elected officials of the local government units. Only 
10 legislators in the 15th Philippine Congress belong to the restrictive category “Dynasty0.” 
[Insert Tables 1, 2, and 3 Here]
Table 4 reveals that the proportion of female legislators who are characterized as dynastic is 
proportional to male legislators who are also characterized as dynastic. This pattern holds across 
the three different definitions of political dynasty. This finding provides evidence that political 
dynasties in the Philippines are gender neutral. Then, Table 5 presents a snapshot of the party 
affiliations in Congress, using the “official” affiliations at the time the data gathering was 
undertaken (i.e. the affiliations immediately after the elections in 2010.) Clearly, it is possible 
that these affiliations continue to change (notably as politicians prepare for local elections in 
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2013).6 Nevertheless, based on the snapshot of affiliations, the evidence suggests that the four 
largest political parties in the Philippine Congress are predominantly dynastic. 
Take the Nacionalista Party (NP) results, for instance. The NP has highest share of political 
dynasties in the Congress. It has fewer kinship links to past legislators (Dynasty1) when 
compared to legislators in other parties but has extensive connections to local government 
executives (Dynasty2). What is interesting, perhaps, is that this pattern holds across the major 
political parties in the Congress. Meanwhile, more than 70 percent of legislators aged at least 70 
can be considered dynastic. Younger legislators do not seem to change the pattern of political 
dynasties. About 77 percent of the youngest legislators (aged 26-40) are actually dynastic. This 
pattern seems to suggest that that the 2nd or 3rd generation members of political families are 
entering politics as well. 
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 Here]
Moreover, political dynasties seem to win by larger election margins than non-dynastic 
candidates. Table 6 reveals higher average margins of victory of dynastic candidates (under all 
definitions) of at least five percentage points.7 Such large margins of victory are seen to be 
critical because political dynasties need to demonstrate that they enjoy sufficient support from 
their constituents and, more importantly, dispel or invalidate insinuations of vote-rigging and 
other illicit election-related activities.
[Insert Tables 6, 7, and 8 Here]
In what follows, we focus on the more extensive dynasty definition (i.e. Dynasty3) given our 
main interest in the political and kinship connections that may influence local governance. Are 
                                                          
6 To capture changes in party affiliations, it might be possible to develop a measure of the 
number of times a particular politician has changed political parties over their political careers. 
This is another area for further study and data-gathering.
7  Data from the province of Lanao Del Sur have not been compiled by the Commission on 
Elections at the time of writing. 
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political dynasties richer? Table 7 reveals that dynastic legislators have, on average, PhP10 
million wealthier than non-dynastic legislators.8 This difference in net worth is not statistically 
different from zero.
Finally, table 8 presents our attempt to analyze the links between political inequality and income 
inequality.9 Measures for poverty incidence, poverty gap, and poverty severity are consistently 
higher in districts with dynastic legislators compared to other areas. Specifically, jurisdictions 
with dynastic legislators tend to have poverty incidence that is five percentage points, poverty 
gap that is one percentage point, and poverty severity that is half a percentage point higher than 
other areas. Not surprisingly, the average income of districts with dynastic representatives is 
lower than that those with non-dynastic representatives. 
Correlates of Political Dynasty Prevalence
A more formal empirical analysis of the correlates between political dynasties, social and 
demographic profile of legislators, and socio-economic context of districts is necessary to 
establish the cause-and-effect relations of the variables. It is possible that the correlation of 
dynastic prevalence with certain outcome indicators becomes less pronounced once confounding 
factors are properly controlled in the empirics. For now, the examination is limited to the links 
across between dynastic prevalence and poverty and inequality (adjusting for factors like the 
population size and employment). The objective is to analyze the overall patterns without yet 
claiming causality. 
                                                          
8  One legislator (with a reported net worth of about PhP1.3 billion) and considered as non-
dynastic is an outlier in the dataset and was excluded from the calculation.
9 Poverty incidence measures the proportion of families below the poverty line. The poverty gap 
refers to the average income shortfall in proportion to the poverty line of poor families. It is the 
average amount of additional income necessary to bring a family above the poverty threshold 
expressed as a proportion of the poverty line. Poverty severity is the squared poverty gap divided 
by the number of poor families. The value of this measure is its sensitivity to the income 
distribution among the poor.
13
Tables 9 to 11 present results on the correlation between the proportion of political dynasties 
(within a province) and the socio-economic outcomes (at the province level). Controlling for 
population, employment, and poverty incidence, the partial correlation coefficient reveals a 
negative relationship between average income and the proportion of dynastic representatives in 
each province. Various combinations of control variables do not alter the finding. In other words, 
there exists an inverse relationship between average income and the proportion of dynastic 
representatives on the provincial level. This result might cohere with at least two possible 
explanations: a) dynasties may not be successful in pursuing or do not pursue policies that raise 
average incomes; and b) that part of the constituency with lower average incomes may tend to 
support dynastic politicians. It should nevertheless be noted that these observations refer to 
aggregated data rather than individual micro-data.
[Insert Tables 9, 10, 11 Here]
Controlling for employment or population size (or both), the partial correlation coefficient finds 
a positive relationship between poverty incidence and the proportion of political dynasties in 
each province. However, the other results give mixed outcomes. These results are indicative of 
the multifaceted nature of poverty. Since poverty can be said to be the confluence of a variety of 
factors, its relationship with the proportion of political dynasties in each province is difficult to 
isolate. Similarly, there is a negative partial correlation between human development and the 
proportion of political dynasties in each province. Given that the index used in the procedure is 
underpinned by health, education, and income, the result coheres with two possible explanations: 
a) provinces with lower aggregate levels of health, education, and income tend to elect dynasties; 
and/or b) dynasties implement policies and programs that may not necessarily improve (or 
possibly lower) aggregate levels of income, health, and education. 
Initially, the above results seem to be inconsistent with earlier findings by Solon et al. (2009) that 
Philippine local government politicians are re-elected through stronger public spending in 
education and health. If political dynasties are successful in retaining power, then it is expected 
that they channel substantial resources towards human capital investments. However, it is 
14
possible that spending does increase—and, on the margin, generates political support for the 
incumbent—but corruption and leakages tend to stifle the impact on human development.10
4. Conclusion
The relationship between political dynasties and socio-economic outcomes is an empirical 
question. This study developed metrics on political dynasties in the Philippines and examined 
them vis-à-vis standard of living, poverty, and human development. The main findings provide 
much food-for-thought. About 70 percent of the 15th Philippine Congress is dynastic. On 
average, political dynasties are spread across the different age and gender groups of legislators. 
So there appears to be little, if any, bias against the young or against women. But political 
dynasties tend to dominate the major political parties and, on average, are located in areas with 
relatively higher poverty levels and inequalities, and relatively lower average incomes. Political 
dynasties tend to be wealthier than non-dynasties. They also win elections by much larger 
margins compared to non-dynasties. While these findings do not answer causality, this paper 
pointed out several important patterns based on empirical evidence.
Future research in this area could focus on several key angles. First, as noted, it would be 
interesting to examine the direction of causality between dynastic prevalence and poverty in the 
Philippine context. To this end, effective instrumental variables need to be developed in order to 
solve the identification issues associated with the estimation procedure. Second, it would also be 
useful to examine the extent to which term limits in the 1987 Philippine Constitution produced an 
unintended effect of encouraging senior politicians to transfer their mantle of power to relatives 
in order to circumvent term limits. An argument can be made that term limits made things worse 
by exacerbating the prevalence of political dynasties, but the extent of the “damage” needs to be 
empirically verified. Third, this study has only touched the surface as far as its empirical analysis 
of political dynastic patterns. The political science literature is rather rich in terms of studying 
political dynasties and the politics of dynasties in the Philippines, but it would still be useful to 
                                                          
10 A cursory investigation reveals that from 12-25 percent of the budgets for infrastructure 
projects to over 50 percent of the budgets for schoolbooks, medicines and other human capital 
investment are lost to corruption (Parreño 1998).
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take the examination in two directions. One is to deepen understanding of the factors that 
contribute to emergence and persistence of political dynasties and their consequences. Another is 
to scrutinize political performance of—and understand the policies that emerge from—political 
dynasties. Finally, further empirical analysis in this area could look into the role that political 
dynasties play in the otherwise weak development of political parties in the Philippines. It has 
been noted by numerous scholars that in the Philippines the politics of personalities trumps the 
development of robust political parties and political platforms. This observation seems to be 
validated by the dominance of political dynasties in most of the major political parties. Further 
empirical analyses of party dynamics using measures such as “turn-coatism” and the party list 
system could help shed light on whether and to what extent clear political platforms and robust 
political party development could offer a viable alternative to more traditional dynastic politics.
These studies could usefully complement existing literature that already flags the challenges 
related to the development of political parties in the Philippines (e.g. Manacsa and Tan 2005; 
Rivera 2011).
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Table 1. Summary statistics of district representatives
Variable Observations Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Min Max
Age 229 52.71 12.95 28 85
Tenure 229 1.60 0.73 1 3
Net Worth 229 PhP53,603,123 PhP109,815,892 PhP1,046,500 PhP1,134,233,000
Margin of Victory 229 31% 24% 0.12% 88%
Table 2. Provincial economic statistics
Variable Observations Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Min Max
Poverty Incidence 94 22.726 14.507 0 52.9
GINI 94 0.384 0.05 0.183 0.513
Per Capita Income 94 24,345 7,724 6,664 37,039
Employment 94 93.205% 4.43% 79.6% 100%
Table 3. Dynastic and Non-Dynastic District Legislators by Definition, total number and percent share
Dynasty0 Dynasty1 Dynasty2 Dynasty3
Dynastic
10 (4.36% of 
Legislators)
84 (36.7% of 
Legislators)
144 (62.9% of 
Legislators)
155 (67.7% of 
Legislators)
Not Dynastic 219 145 85 74
Table 4. Dynastic and Non-Dynastic District Legislators by Gender, Political Party and Age, total number and percent share
Legislators Dynasty0 Dynasty1 Dynasty2 Dynasty3
Female 50
3 (6% of Female 
Legislators)
21 (42.0% of Female 
Legislators)
32 (64% of Female 
Legislators)
36 (72% of Female 
Legislators)
Male 179
7 (3.9% of Male 
Legislators)
63 (35.2% of Male 
Legislators)
112 (62.6% of Male 
Legislators)
119 (66.5% of Male 
Legislators)
Total 229 10 84 144 155
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Table 5. Dynastic and Non-Dynastic District Legislators by Political Party and Age, Total number and percent share
POLITICAL PARTY
Legislators Dynasty0 Dynasty1 Dynasty2 Dynasty3
LAKAS-KAMPI 76
7 (9.21% of LAKAS-
KAMPI Legislators)
38 (50.0% of LAKAS-
KAMPI Legislators)
53 (69.7% of LAKAS-
KAMPI Legislators)
58 (76.3% of LAKAS-
KAMPI Legislators)
Liberal Party 75
1 (1.33% of LP 
Legislators)
18 (24.0% of LP 
Legislators)
40 (53.3% of LP 
Legislators)
43 (57.3% of LP 
Legislators)
NPC 34 0
17 (50.0% of NPC 
Legislators)
24 (70.6% of NPC 
Legislators)
25 (73.5% of NPC 
Legislators)
Nacionalista Party 21
1 (4.76% of NP 
Legislators)
7 (33.3% of NP 
Legislators)
17 (81% of NP 
Legislators)
17 (81% of NP 
Legislators)
Total 206 9 80 134 143
AGE
Legislators Dynasty0 Dynasty1 Dynasty2 Dynasty3
26-40 39
4 (10.26% of Age 26-
40 Legislators)
18 (46.2% of Age 26-40 
Legislators)
29 (74.4% of Age 26-40 
Legislators)
30 (76.9% of Age 26-
40 Legislators)
41-55 98
3 (3.06% of Age 41-55 
Legislators)
34 (34.7% of Age 41-55 
Legislators)
60 (61.2% of Age 41-55 
Legislators)
63 (64.3% of Age 41-
55 Legislators)
56-70 67
2 (2.99% of Age 56-70 
Legislators)
21 (31.3% of Age 56-70 
Legislators)
37 (55.2% of Age 56-70 
Legislators)
41 (61.2% of Age 56-
70 Legislators)
70+ 25
1 (4% of Age 70+ 
Legislators)
11 (44.0% of Age 70+ 
Legislators)
18 (72.0% of Age 70+ 
Legislators)
21 (84.0% of Age 70+ 
Legislators)
Total 229 10 84 144 155
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Table 6. Average Margins of Victory of Dynastic and Non-Dynastic Legislators
Dynasty1 Dynasty2 Dynasty3 
Dynastic 36.43pp 33.34pp 33.26pp
Non-Dynastic 28.49pp 28.23pp 27.64pp
Mean Difference 7.94pp 5.11pp 5.62pp
Test Statistic 2.3477 (0.0094***) 1.5068 (0.0655*) 1.6602 (0.0485**)
Notes: pp = percentage points; p-values in parentheses: * significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 
0.01.
Table 7. Legislators’ Net Worth, using Dynasty3
Net Worth Net Worth (sans MP)
Dynasty (in 1,000 pesos) PhP52,012 PhP52,013
Non-Dynasty (in 1,000 pesos) PhP56,913 PhP42,155
Mean Difference (in 1,000 pesos) -PhP4,901 PhP9,857
Test Statistic and p-Value -0.2525 (0.4013) 0.7671 (0.2236)
Notes: The calculations for both columns exclude Congressman Ronald Singson who was replaced in early 2011. The 
calculations in the last column exclude Congressman Emmanuel Pacquiao whose net worth is an outlier in the Congress.  
p-values in parentheses: * significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01.
Table 8. Per capita income, poverty incidence, gap and severity for dynastic and non-dynastic districts, in percent
Per Capita Income Poverty Incidence Poverty Gap Poverty Severity
Dynastic Php23,275.43 24.15 6.18 2.31
Non-Dynastic PhP26,872.38 18.95 4.93 1.86
Mean Difference -PhP  3,596.95 5.2 1.25 0.45
Test Statistic -3.565 (0.0003***) 2.606 (0.0039***) 2.107 (0.0174**) 1.794 (0.0367**)
Notes: Calculations use Dynasty3 definition (i.e., share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links to legislators in the 12th, 
13th, 14th, and 15th Congresses, as well as local government officials elected in 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010). Income variable is 2009 
GDP per capita. p-values are in parentheses, * significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01.
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Table 9. Partial correlations of Dynasty3 vs. per capita income
Controls Per Capita Income (1997 Prices)
Population (Pop) -0.297 (0.004)***
Employment (Emp) -0.331 (0.001)***
Poverty Incidence (Pov) -0.248 (0.016)**
Pop-Emp -0.309 (0.003)***
Pop-Pov -0.246 (0.018)**
Emp-Pov -0.259 (0.013)**
Pop-Emp-Pov -0.259 (0.013)**
Note: p-values in parentheses: * significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05, *** 
significant at 0.01.
Table 10. Partial correlations of Dynasty3 vs. poverty incidence and dynasty 3 vs. GINI
Controls Poverty Incidence Provincial GINI
Population (Pop) 0.179 (0.086)* -0.099 (0.345)
Employment (Emp) 0.217 (0.037)** -0.077 (0.461)
PCI -0.56 (0.595) -0.012 (0.909)
Pop-Emp 0.181 (0.084)* -0.099 (0.347)
Pop-PCI -0.050 (0.633) -0.007 (0.946)
Emp-PCI -0.039 (0.710) -0.010 (0.928)
Pop-Emp-PCI - 0.051 (0.629) -0.018 (0.868)
Note: P-values are in parentheses; p-values are in parentheses, * significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05, 
*** significant at 0.01.
Table 11. Partial correlations of Dynasty3 vs. HDI
Controls HDI-I HDI-II
Population (Pop) -0.251(0.015**) -0.125(0.232)
Employment (Emp) -0.293(0.004***) -0.167(0.109)
Pop-Emp -0.267(0.01***) -0.131(0.212)
Note: P-values are in parentheses; p-values are in parentheses, * significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05, 
*** significant at 0.01.
